![]() However, even some proponents of intentionally slowing growth assert that many aspects of modern socioeconomic systems rely on long-run growth 21, 22. On the other hand, some have noted that key drivers of slowing economic growth in developed democracies reflect important gains in human well-being-for example, gains in women’s’ rights contributing to falling birth rates, and an abundance of durable goods fuelling shifts towards service economies 20. Several countries have recently elected populists who openly challenge some of these values, including Hungary, Italy, Poland, Turkey and the United States. Trust in these institutions is declining in some developed democracies, especially among youth 17, 19. Democratic institutions such as free press and fair elections have been under attack since the onset of the global financial crisis 16. Many developed democracies are already under stress 16, 17, 18. Other challenges we discuss-such as fiscal challenges-are less specific to democratic systems. Some of the challenges that slow growth or stagnation could pose to developed democracies affect democracy itself, such as stresses to social capital-the social cohesion, trust, norms, information flows and civic institutions that underpin healthy democracies 14-or increases in inequality and consequent concentrations of political power 15. ![]() Surveys often find democratic freedoms to be positively related with subjective well-being (see, for example, ref. Freedoms of thought, speech and assembly have been critical to the creation and dissemination of knowledge-as exemplified by, for instance, 48 of the world’s 50 top universities being found in democratic countries 12. These freedoms, coupled with the rule of law, have been critical drivers of growth 4, 6, with few exceptions 4. Democracies, in general, have brought gains in political, economic and intellectual freedom. ![]() 1a, b) and because instability within developed democracies would have significant implications for the international order. We focus on developed democracies, because developed countries (most of which are democracies) may reach long-run stagnation first (Fig. We consider de-growth (in contrast to slow growth and stagnation) to lie mostly beyond the scope of our discussion, since economists consider unintentional de-growth unlikely 9, and intentional de-growth (which some have called for 10) seems unlikely to gain political traction in democracies 11. 1b) but now may face the prospect of long-run slowdowns in economic growth in the twenty-first century. Developed (that is, high-income) democracies have been at the forefront of these trends (Fig. There is some evidence of bidirectional causality: on average (with some exceptions), open, democratic institutions promote growth 4, 5, 6, and long-run growth and affluence promote the formation of democratic institutions 7, 8. In the early nineteenth century, less than 1% of the world’s population lived in a democracy, compared with about 55% today 3. This unprecedented global growth has temporally coincided with the global proliferation of democracy (Fig. Since the Industrial Revolutions, most countries have escaped the ‘Malthusian trap’-where land productivity growth led to growth in population but not affluence 1-and global affluence has increased by more than a factor of ten 1, 2. Before the Industrial Revolutions, there was both little per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth and little democracy (Fig. Modern liberal democracies-with broad economic and political freedom and stability-predominate in today’s developed world, but they are a historical anomaly. We call for a ‘guided civic revival’, including government and civic efforts aimed at reducing inequality, socially integrating diverse populations and building shared identities, increasing economic opportunity for youth, improving return on investment in taxation and public spending, strengthening formal democratic institutions and investing to improve non-economic drivers of subjective well-being. Whether slow growth is inevitable or planned, we argue that developed democracies should prepare for additional fiscal and social stress, some of which is already apparent. Some sustainability scientists assert that slower growth, stagnation or de-growth is an environmental imperative, especially in developed countries. Long-run effects of COVID-19 and climate change could further slow growth. Macroeconomic forecasts predict slowing growth throughout the twenty-first century for structural reasons such as ageing populations, shifts from goods to services, slowing innovation, and debt. Developed democracies proliferated over the past two centuries during an unprecedented era of economic growth, which may be ending.
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